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Abstract 
This study analyses the composition and main determinants of spending dynamics in selected euro area 
countries between 1999 and 2013. To assess the stance of public spending policies we use the indica­
tors developed in Hauptmeier et al. (2011). Our results indicate that the overall expansionary expendi­
ture stance in 1999-2009 was mainly driven by public consumption. Transfers and subsidies on the 
other hand were mostly expansionary after 2008 while public investment had boomed just before the 
crisis and turned restrictive during the crisis. The overall policy stance turned restrictive in 2010 and 
strongly so in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Most consolidation efforts focussed on public in­
vestment and on public consumption and while transfers and subsidies were largely spared. Our econo­
metric analysis, which covers the 2000-2013 period, shows a significantly pro-cyclical stance of public 
consumption which was driving overall spending dynamics. The degree of spending expansion tends 
to be negatively affected by the size of government debt and the presence of effective fiscal rules. On 
the other hand, EMU-related interest savings coincided with an expansionary expenditure stance. Rev­
enue windfalls and shortfalls exerted a significant effect on government investment spending. 
Keywords: Expenditure policies, public debt, expenditure rules, sustainability, fiscal stance. 
JEL Classification: E17, E61, E65, H50, H60. 
1. Introduction 
Public spending dynamics constitute an important determinant of developments in head­
line fiscal indicators such as the deficit and debt ratio. A number of recent studies provide 
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evidence that government expenditures have been the main reason for the deterioration of 
fiscal positions in most advanced economies since around the turn of the millennium 
(see, e.g., Turrini, 2008, Schuknecht, 2009; Rother et al., 2011, and Trachanas and Katraki­
lidis 2013). Hauptmeier et al. (2011) develop a set of indicators to assess the policy stance 
of government expenditure in selected euro area countries (and for the euro area aggregate) 
relative to benchmark rates guided by long-term or potential growth in economic activity. 
The study finds that in many countries expenditure policies had been expansionary from the 
start of EMU which prevented the built-up of sufficient fiscal buffers in economic «good 
times». As a result, many euro area countries already entered the financial and economic 
crisis in 2007/2008 with relatively weak fiscal positions. This certainly contributed to the 
subsequent emergence of the so called European debt-crisis. 
In this paper, we extend the analysis of Hauptmeier et al. (2011) in two directions. First, 
we provide a disaggregated analysis of expenditure dynamics in 12 euro area countries over 
1999-2013, focussing on three expenditure aggregates which governments can affect in the 
short-run, i.e. public consumption, public investment as well as transfers and subsidies. Our 
results indicate that the overall expansionary expenditure stance in 1999-2009 was mainly 
driven by an expansion of public consumption during the whole period. Transfers and sub­
sidies, on the other hand, were mostly expansionary post-Lehmann while public investment 
had boomed just before the crisis and turned restrictive during the crisis. The aggregate 
policy stance turned restrictive in 2010 and strongly so in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain while most consolidation efforts focussed on public consumption and on public invest­
ment while largely sparing transfers and subsidies. 
Second, the study provides an econometric analysis of the determinants of expenditure 
patterns over the 2000-2013 period. It suggests a pro-cyclical pattern of public consumption 
spending. The expenditure stance, i.e. the excess of spending growth over the neutral bench­
mark rate (total and most categories), tends to be negatively affected by the size of public 
debt (less expansionary, the higher public debt) and the presence of effective fiscal rules. On 
the other hand, we find a significant positive effect of EMU-related interest savings and elec­
tions. Moreover, investment spending dynamics tend to be linked to the emergence of reve­
nue windfalls / shortfalls. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of 
expenditure patterns in EMU and disentangles the expenditure stance in EMU across spend­
ing categories across countries and over time. Section 3 reports on the cumulative effect of 
the expenditure stance on spending ratios. Section 4 discusses the determinants of patterns 
in the expenditure composition. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Expenditure stance across countries, time and categories 
We analyse public expenditure in selected euro area countries across the three main 
expenditure components that governments can influence in the short term: government con­
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Primary expenditures 
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43,5 42,5 47,8 47,1 46,5 
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43,1 43,4 48,9 48,4 48,2 
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1999 2007 2009 2010 2013 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
19,4 19,5 21,7 21,4 21,2 
19,5 20,3 22,5 22,3 21,9 
Transfers and subsidies Public investment 
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(12) (13) (14) 
16,4 18,5 18,5 
19,1 20,9 21,0 
16,9 19,1 19,1 







1999 2007 2009 2010 2013 
(16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
3,1 3,2 3,6 3,4 2,8 
2,8 2,9 3,4 3,2 2,9 
2,4 2,0 2,2 2,2 2,2 
2,4 2,0 2,3 2,3 2,2 
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sumption, transfers and subsidies and public investment. Table 1 gives an overview of spend­
ing developments —as a ratio to GDP— for 12 euro area countries and the euro area (12) 
aggregate between 1999 and 2013. A number of interesting findings can be deducted from 
these data: First, between 1999 and 2007, primary spending increased as a ratio to GDP in 
all countries except for Austria, Germany and Finland, in some cases significantly. During 
the same period the output gap averaged at 1% of GDP, i.e. spending increases relative GDP 
took place in economic «good times». Spending increases were strongly driven by public 
consumption (e.g. in Greece and the Netherlands), in some cases also by increases in trans­
fers and subsidies (e.g. Portugal) and public investment (e.g. Ireland). 
Table 1
 
MAIN FISCAL INDICATORS (% OF GDP)
 
Transfers and subsidies Public investment 
1999 2007 2009 2010 2013 1999 2007 2009 2010 2013 
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Spain 13,1 12,5 15,5 16,2 17,3 3,8 4,6 5,1 4,7 2,1 
Finland 18,6 15,8 18,6 18,9 20,4 3,9 3,5 4,0 3,7 4,2 
France 18,7 18,8 20,9 21,0 21,6 3,8 3,9 4,3 4,1 4,0 
Greece 13,8 14,7 17,6 17,9 18,8 3,8 4,3 4,6 3,2 2,7 
Ireland 9,5 10,8 15,8 15,8 14,6 3,1 4,6 3,7 3,4 1,7 
Italy 17,5 17,6 19,9 20,0 21,5 2,9 2,9 3,4 2,9 2,4 
Luxembourg 14,2 15,1 18,3 17,5 17,8 4,2 3,7 4,3 4,6 3,5 
Netherlands 12,7 11,0 12,3 12,6 13,1 3,8 3,9 4,3 4,1 3,6 
Portugal 12,1 14,9 17,1 17,2 18,9 4,9 3,2 4,1 5,3 2,2 
Memorandum: 
EA(12) - DE 
16,6 16,1 18,5 18,7 19,6 3,5 3,6 4,0 3,8 3,0 
Source: Ameco. 
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In the context of the financial and economic crisis, public primary expenditure increased 
markedly in the euro area between 2007 and 2009 (by around 5pps of GDP on average), now 
mainly owing to increases in transfers and subsidies but also further increases in public con­
sumption. As of 2010, primary expenditure as a ratio to GDP started to decline in most euro 
area countries. However, Table 1 shows that the spending adjustment did not reverse the 
developments observed up to 2009. While public investment was reduced on average by 
0.8pp of GDP —accounting for more than 60% of the overall adjustment in primary ex­
penditure—, public consumption declined by 0.5pp of GDP whereas transfers and subsidies 
increased slightly. As a result, aggregate public investment in the euro area (12) fell below 
the 1999 level in 2013 whereas public consumption as well as transfers and subsidies still 
significantly exceeded the 1999 GDP ratios. 
While one can already derive important insights from longer-term developments in 
spending-to-GDP ratios, a proper assessment of the policy stance of government expenditure 
on a year-by-year basis will need to compare spending growth with some form of benchmark 
rate that abstracts from cyclical swings. Hauptmeier et al. (2011) develop a set of indicators 
which aim at defining a «neutral» expenditure stance on the basis of expenditure rules 
guided by long-term or potential growth in economic activity1. In this paper, we use two of 
the expenditure rules presented in Hauptmeier et al. (2011): 
1. Nominal Potential GDP Growth (NPG): According to this rule, spending growth is 
considered as neutral if the growth rate equals that of nominal potential GDP in a 
given year. 
2. Real Potential GDP growth + ECB price stability objective (RPECB): According to 
this rule, spending growth is considered as neutral if the growth rate equals that of 
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real potential GDP plus the ECB price stability objective (for simplicity we set the 
deflator component of the rule to 2%). 
Both rules are computed on the basis of real time data (using past vintages of the Euro-
pean Commission’s annual macro-economic database (AMECO)) and ex post data (latest 
published AMECO vintage). Using real-time data —in addition to the standard ex-post 
evaluation— allows us to also assess spending policies on the basis of the information set 
available to policy-makers at the time of implementation of policy measures2. Overall, we 
therefore use four measures of expenditure stance. 
Figure 1 compares actual developments in spending as a ratio to GDP (primary spending 
and the three subcategories) for the euro area (12) aggregate to the counterfactual of develop­
ments that would have occurred if spending growth in each year had followed the «neutral 
rates» generated by our set of expenditure rules. When computing these alternative spending 
paths, we take into account macroeconomic feedback effects related to the alternative rule­
based spending paths when computing GDP ratios. In this context, we use impact fiscal 
multipliers computed in Coenen et al. (2012) who carry out a model comparison exercise on 
the basis of various large-scale macroeconomic models3. Concretely, we consider the middle 
point of the range presented in this study to construct country-specific GDP multipliers, 
explicitly taking into account the country-specific structure of government spending. Using 
this approach, the size of the GDP multiplier varies from 0.47 in Greece to 0.57 in the case 
of Ireland. More detailed information can be received from the authors upon request. 
Figure 1 shows that primary expenditure —for the euro area (12) aggregate— remained 
close to the NPG ex-post rule until 2007 before decoupling until 2010. Public consumption 
on the other hand shows a strongly expansionary pattern for the whole period up to 2010. 
For the period 2010-2013, the stance for aggregate spending and public consumption 
was restrictive as illustrated by the shrinking distance between actual and neutral spending. 
Transfers and subsidies do not show a expansionary path at the aggregate level, in the pre­
crises period before exceeding ex-post «neutral» levels in the crisis (as of 2009)4. Public 
investment spending was expansionary from about 2005-2009 before it became strongly 
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Primary expenditures Public consumption 
Transfers and subsidies Public investment 
Figure 1. Euro Area (12). Actual versus rule-based expenditure developments, euro area  
aggregate across rules and main expenditure components 
However, this aggregate euro area (12) view hides significant cross-country differences. 
Table 2 shows cumulative deviations from the neutral spending paths for individual countries 
for different time periods: (i) 1999-2007, (ii) 2008-2009 and (iii) 2010-2013. This enables us 
to highlight time patterns, notably with a view to distinguishing developments before, during 
and in the aftermath of the economic and financial crisis. Note that positive figures indicate 
cumulative positive deviations from the rule in % of GDP and vice versa. 
In accordance with Hauptmeier et al. (2011), this analysis shows a restrictive primary
expenditure stance for Austria, Finland and strongly so for Germany over the 1999-2007 pe­
riod while cumulative primary spending dynamics exceed the neutral spending rule in all other
sample countries. This holds for the real-time and the ex-post assessment alike. At the same
time, the divergence between real-time and ex-post rules is remarkable, indicating the rele­
vance of data revisions. For the euro area as a whole, ex-post downward revisions in potential
growth have resulted in a more expansionary aggregate stance for all sub-periods, but in par­
ticular for the years as of 2008. Table 2 also highlights notable differences in the results for the
NPG and RPECB, indicating that in some countries expenditure levels grew more partly be-
cause of their higher inflation. This can be observed, in particular in Spain, Greece and Ireland
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for the pre-crisis period. Extreme values for deviations are Germany, where primary expendi­
ture fell short of rule based spending by some 4.8pp of GDP cumulatively between 1999 and
2007. On the other hand, Greece shows a very expansionary spending stance (positive devia­
tion between 6pp to 8pp of GDP, depending on the rule) during this period. 
The degree of expansion varies strongly between the different expenditure components 
and countries. For most of the EA-12 countries, the expansionary spending stance was 
strongly driven by public consumption, while for Greece and Portugal increases in transfers 
and subsidies explain the bulk of excess spending dynamics between 1999 and 2007. With 
the exception of Ireland and Spain, government investment did not contribute much to the 
expansionary spending in the pre-crisis period. 
Table 2 also highlights interesting changes in spending patterns during the crisis. For the 
immediate crisis period 2008-2009 we observe a particularly expansionary spending stance 
in Belgium, Spain, Greece, Netherlands and Portugal in the order of between around 2 and 
5pp of GDP above the neutral rule assessed in real-time. These developments reflect both 
discretionary spending measures to combat the severe economic downturn as well as strong 
expenditure dynamics notably on transfers and subsidies. At the same time, the assessment 
of the spending stance changes significantly when switching to the ex-post rule. Using ac­
tual data for the years 2008 and 2009 we find a substantially larger degree of spending expan­
sion relative to our neutral expenditure rule in all countries (high remarkable are the cases of 
Greece and Ireland). This is due to a sharp ex-post correction of potential growth rates in 
these two years which makes the expenditure stance, due to the way we define our «neutral» 
stance, much more expansionary as well. The comparison of real-time and ex-post assess­
ment highlights the problems related to fiscal surveillance and coordination based on real-
time macroeconomic variables, especially around cyclical turning points. 
Finally, looking at the spending developments in real-time between 2010 and 2013 we 
observe a significant tightening of the expenditure stance, notably in those countries facing 
financial constraints (Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal). Expenditure consolidation was 
also significant in Italy and, somewhat less so, in Austria and Luxembourg. Again, ex-post 
information confirms the lower impact of these consolidation packages, reducing the coun­
tries presenting restrictive policies to the former group mentioned above. As the rest of 
countries present also expansionary policies during this last period, the tightening seems to 
reflect large scale fiscal consolidation measures which became necessary following the 
strong fiscal loosening before and in the context of the crisis and the much increased debt 
financing costs during the European fiscal crisis as of 2010. To some extent this adjustment 
and its composition reverts previous expansionary trends in certain spending components. In 
particular, the adjustment in public consumption constitutes the largest contribution to the 
restrictive primary spending stance in Greece, Italy and Portugal. On the other hand, with the 
exception of Greece, transfers and subsidies only play a minor role in the recent expenditure 
adjustment. In fact, this spending category shows a neutral or even expansionary stance in 
most of the sample countries showing its counter-cyclical nature. At the same time, it is well 
worth mentioning that government investment stands for a significant part of the 2010-2013 


























Primary expenditures -0,5 
Public consumption 0,3 
Transfers and subsidies -0,9 
Public investment 0,1 
Others 0,0 
Primary expenditures 1,1 
Public consumption 0,2 
Transfers and subsidies 0,5 
Public investment 0,2 
Others 0,2 
Primary expenditures -1,2 
Public consumption -0,7 
Transfers and subsidies 0,5 
Public investment -0,8 
Others -0,2 




Primary expenditures 0,1 
Public consumption 0,6 
Transfers and subsidies -0,6 
Public investment 0,1 
Others 0,0 
AUT BEL DEU ESP 
0,6 1,8 -4,8 3,4 
0,3 1,1 -1,6 1,9 
-0,8 1,0 -2,8 0,5 
0,3 -0,2 -0,4 0,9 
0,8 -0,1 0,0 0,1 
1,4 2,2 0,3 3,5 
0,4 0,7 0,4 1,3 
0,1 1,2 -0,6 1,9 
0,3 0,1 0,3 0,3 
0,5 0,2 0,2 0,0 
-1,2 2,8 0,0 -4,3 
-0,4 0,4 0,6 -1,8 
0,1 1,5 -0,9 2,0 
-0,4 0,0 0,1 -3,1 
-0,5 0,9 0,2 -1,4 
AUT BEL DEU ESP 
-1,4 1,3 -3,6 1,7 
-0,5 0,9 -1,0 1,1 
-1,6 0,8 -2,2 -0,1 
0,2 -0,3 -0,4 0,8 























FRA GRC IRL 
1,2 5,0 2,6 
0,2 3,5 1,2 
0,5 1,2 1,1 
0,2 0,6 1,1 
0,3 -0,3 -0,8 
1,0 3,4 0,1 
-0,2 0,9 -0,8 
0,7 1,7 2,5 
0,1 0,0 -1,2 
0,4 0,9 -0,3 
0,5 -18,2 -8,2 
-0,1 -8,8 -2,7 
0,9 -3,8 0,6 
-0,2 -4,3 -3,9 
-0,1 -1,4 -2,2 
FRA GRC IRL 
1,4 5,5 4,5 
0,3 3,7 2,1 
0,6 1,4 1,7 
0,2 0,6 1,3 
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Table 2
 
CUMULATIVE DEVIATIONS FROM RULE-BASED SPENDING FOR SELECTED PERIODS,
 


































Panel C: Real-time RPECB rule 
Euro  
Area AUT BEL DEU ESP FIN FRA GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT 
(12) 
Primary expenditures 0,7 0,6 2,0 -4,8 6,1 -0,5 1,2 7,8 5,1 2,1 1,3 3,3 3,4 
Public consumption 0,8 0,3 1,2 -1,6 3,2 1,2 0,2 4,8 2,4 1,5 0,7 3,9 2,0
 
Transfers and subsidies -0,4 -0,8 1,1 -2,8 1,4 -1,7 0,5 2,3 1,8 0,6 1,0 -0,7 3,0
 
Public investment 0,2 0,3 -0,2 -0,4 1,2 -0,2 0,2 0,8 1,4 0,1 -0,4 0,3 -1,3
 
Others 0,1 0,8 -0,1 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,3 -0,1 -0,6 -0,1 0,0 -0,1 -0,3
 
Primary expenditures 1,5 1,5 2,5 0,3 4,3 1,8 1,0 5,0 0,6 0,6 1,8 2,6 3,0
 
Public consumption 0,4 0,5 0,8 0,4 1,7 0,7 -0,2 1,6 -0,6 -0,4 0,5 1,7 0,1
 
Transfers and subsidies 0,6 0,2 1,3 -0,6 2,2 0,4 0,8 2,2 2,7 1,0 1,5 0,5 1,5
 
Public investment 0,2 0,3 0,1 0,3 0,4 0,2 0,1 0,1 -1,2 0,3 0,1 0,1 0,6
 
Others 0,2 0,5 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,6 0,4 1,0 -0,3 -0,2 -0,2 0,3 0,7
 
Primary expenditures -1,1 -1,0 3,1 0,0 -4,3 3,3 0,5 -17,4 -8,2 -2,1 4,5 -1,3 -3,1
 
Public consumption -0,7 -0,4 0,6 0,6 -1,8 0,4 -0,1 -8,4 -2,7 -2,1 2,1 -0,8 -3,1
 
Transfers and subsidies 0,5 0,2 1,6 -0,9 2,0 2,3 0,9 -3,5 0,6 1,3 2,0 0,7 2,0
 
Public investment -0,8 -0,4 0,0 0,1 -3,1 0,1 -0,2 -4,2 -3,9 -0,9 -0,2 -0,9 -2,0
 
Others -0,2 -0,4 0,9 0,2 -1,4 0,5 -0,1 -1,3 -2,2 -0,3 0,6 -0,3 0,0
 
Panel D: Ex-post RPECB rule 
Euro  
Area AUT BEL DEU ESP FIN FRA GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT 
(12) 
Primary expenditures 1,2 -1,0 1,9 -3,6 5,6 0,1 1,8 7,9 7,7 3,4 2,7 3,3 4,2 
Public consumption 1,1 -0,4 1,2 -1,0 2,9 1,5 0,5 4,8 3,7 2,1 1,3 3,9 2,4
 
Transfers and subsidies -0,2 -1,5 1,1 -2,2 1,3 -1,5 0,7 2,3 2,6 1,1 1,6 -0,7 3,2
 
Public investment 0,2 0,2 -0,2 -0,4 1,2 -0,2 0,2 0,8 1,7 0,2 -0,2 0,3 -1,3
 
Others 0,1 0,6 -0,1 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,0 -0,4 0,0 0,1 -0,1 -0,2
 
Primary expenditures 2,8 2,4 3,8 1,1 5,5 4,0 2,5 8,6 7,8 2,0 3,3 3,8 3,9
 
Public consumption 1,0 0,8 1,4 0,8 2,2 1,7 0,5 3,3 2,8 0,2 1,1 2,4 0,6
 
Transfers and subsidies 1,2 0,6 1,8 -0,3 2,5 1,1 1,3 3,5 4,9 1,6 2,1 0,8 1,8
 
Public investment 0,3 0,4 0,2 0,3 0,6 0,4 0,2 0,5 -0,2 0,4 0,2 0,3 0,7
 
Others 0,3 0,6 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,8 0,5 1,2 0,3 -0,1 0,0 0,4 0,8
 
Primary expenditures 0,7 0,2 4,0 0,5 -2,8 7,0 2,8 -8,8 -6,2 0,4 4,5 1,4 -1,3
 
Public consumption 0,1 0,1 1,0 0,9 -1,1 2,1 0,9 -4,4 -1,8 -1,0 2,0 0,8 -2,3
 
Transfers and subsidies 1,2 0,7 2,0 -0,7 2,6 3,5 1,8 -0,2 1,2 2,3 2,0 1,4 2,7
 
Public investment -0,6 -0,3 0,1 0,1 -3,0 0,4 0,0 -3,5 -3,6 -0,8 -0,2 -0,6 -1,8
 
Others 0,0 -0,3 1,0 0,3 -1,3 1,0 0,1 -0,7 -2,1 -0,1 0,6 -0,1 0,2
 
Source: Ameco. 
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3. Determinants of the expenditure stance 
An empirical analysis of the factors influencing countries’ expenditure stance can pro­
vide further insights on the reasons and remedies for expansionary expenditure policies. We
therefore employ standard fixed-effects panel estimation techniques for our sample of 12 
euro area countries5 over the 2000-2013 period to explain the governments’ expenditure 
stance on the basis of fiscal and macroeconomic factors, relevant institutional characteristics 
as well as political economy variables6. Our empirical model has the following specification: 
y = (B + u ) + XB  +T + eit i t it 
As the dependent variable in these regressions we use our measure of the expenditure 
stance, i.e. the (marginal, i.e. year-by-year) deviations of actual spending growth from rule­
based or neutral spending (see Section 2). 
We include country-fixed effects (ui) to control for unobserved time-invariant heteroge­
neity in our cross-section. Moreover, a full set of time dummies (T ) is included to controlt
for common shocks. 
The choice of independent variables for our basic model explaining the expenditure stance
is fairly standard. First, we control for the macroeconomic environment by including the output
gap. This allows us to test the cyclicality of the spending stance. Given that a contemporaneous
inclusion of the output gap may cause problems of endogeneity, in our baseline specification,
we follow Gali and Perotti (2003) and Turrini (2008) and include the output gap as a percentage
of potential GDP with a lag. There are of course alternative ways to overcome potential endo­
geneity problems related to the inclusion of the output gap. Table 5 therefore presents a sensi­
tivity analysis using several of the approaches used in the literature7 . 
The stock of government debt and interest payments are included as fiscal sustainability 
indicators since a higher debt burden should limit the room for budgetary manoeuvre and 
discourage discretionary spending. We introduce the stock of government debt -with a lag- 
and interest payments (leaded). We also incorporate a variable capturing revenue surprises 
since positive surprises on the revenue side of the budget may translate into more expansion­
ary expenditure policies with a lag. This is taken into account by including a dummy that 
equals 1 if actual government revenues turn out higher than projected by the European Com­
mission in the initial forecast. Here we make use of our real-time AMECO vintage, i.e. we 
compute differences between projected government revenues in real-time versus ex-post 
outcomes. Finally, Bénétrix and Lane (2010) find that the deterioration of fiscal balances 
during the crisis was highly correlated with financial imbalances accumulated in the pre­
crisis period. To control for this effect in our specification, we include domestic credit growth 
(previous 5 years average). 
A second set of independent variables captures institutional factors. In particular, we 
include expenditure rules index developed by Debrun et al. (2008) to control for the extent 
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to which national expenditure policy faces domestic institutional constraints8. This index 
includes all budgetary provisions, which fix numerical targets or ceilings to government 
expenditure. We would expect the pro-cyclicality of expenditure policies to be lower in the 
presence of strong budgetary institutions on the expenditure side. We also interact the ex­
penditure rule index with the output gap and expect a negative coefficient, given that strong 
institutions should reduce spending expansion notably in good times. We also test for a 
contingent effect of the debt ratio and analyse whether strong expenditure rules limit the 
spending of revenue windfalls by incorporating an interaction with the rules index. Moreo­
ver, we include a dummy capturing whether a country is facing an external surveillance for 
public finances, either the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) due to deficits above the 3% 
of GDP reference value of the Stability and Growth Pact or, more recently, EU/IMF eco­
nomic adjustment programmes applied to some of the countries we consider in this study. 
Political variables typically also play a role in determining fiscal outcomes. In particu­
lar, electoral cycles might affect spending policies in the sense that upcoming parliamen­
tary elections —which we control for by including a dummy variable— increase political 
incentives to expand the budget. Moreover we include two variables related to the existence
of political constraints in deciding and implementing expenditure policies. First, one vari­
able (extracted from the World Bank Database of Political Institutions) captures the years 
left in the current election term, expecting a negative sign since the incentives for fiscal 
discipline can be expected to be higher at the beginning of the legislative period. Second, 
we include a political constraints index developed by Henisz (2000), which is regularly 
updated and widely used in the empirical literature on fiscal policy (e.g. Lane, 2003; Fatás
and Mihov, 2003). 
The results of our regression analysis are presented in Tables 3 and 4 corresponding to 
ex-post and real-time rules, respectively9. Starting with the impact of the cycle on the ex­
penditure stance, our regression analysis confirms the indications from our descriptive
analysis in Section 2. In particular, the results suggest a procyclical stance of primary ex­
penditure which was driven by public consumption, i.e. excess spending over our neutral 
policy rule(s) in this category tended to increase when macroeconomic conditions improved. 
On the other hand, the coefficient on the output gap, when using the stance of transfers and 
subsidies as well as government investment on the left hand side, rarely show significance. 
These findings are robust to the inclusion of alternative measures of the cycle (see Table 5). 
The stock of public debt and the interest burden show negative significant coefficients 
for most of the specifications and spending categories. This is in line with the hypothesis that 
a higher debt burden should reduce the budgetary room for manoeuvre and constrain spend­
ing outcomes. With regard to the role of the financial imbalances accumulated during the 
pre-crisis period, our findings are in line with Bénétrix and Lane (2010) for transfers and 
subsidies and public consumption (borderline statistical significance). Interestingly, govern­
ments react to tighter financial conditions by applying more prudent spending policies in 
general, but in particular for public consumption and public investment. This latter finding 
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significant extent relied on cuts in public investment rather than on reducing transfer and 
subsidies. This finding may cast some doubt on the design of the adjustment and their 
growth-friendliness. 
Regression results also point to a significant effect of revenue surprises on spending
dynamics, for public consumption and, public investment. Concretely, in line with what
one would expect, unexpected revenue windfalls tend to increase spending growth above
potential. 
Our results also suggest that strong budgetary institutions in the form of effective ex­
penditure rules exert an impact on the design of the spending stance. The interaction term of 
the expenditure framework and the public debt shows a negative and significant coefficient 
in the case of public consumption, suggesting that higher debt in the presence of effective
expenditure rules leads governments to constrain public consumption. This finding is along 
the lines of Holm-Hadulla et al. (2012), Turrini (2008) and Wierts (2008). On the other hand 
we find a positive significant effect in the case of public investment. This is an interesting 
result which could be interpreted in a way that governments also target the composition of 
government spending when restraining expenditure dynamics, i.e. putting an emphasis also 
on the design of spending consolidation as regards their growth-friendliness. 
Finally, turning to the political economy variables, we find that the expenditure stance is 
mostly unaffected (coefficients are not statistically significant) except for the Political Con­
straint Index proposed by Henisz (2000) in real time (positive). An interpretation of this 
index is that power dispersion reduces governments’ ability to introduce legal or constitu­
tional changes. In our framework, governments’ effective capacity to tackle expansionary 
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5. Conclusions 
This study analyses expenditure dynamics in 12 euro area countries over 1999-2013. It
finds that expanding public consumption —relative to benchmark measures of potential eco­
nomic activity— drove an overall expansionary (primary) expenditure stance in 1999-2009.
Transfers and subsidies were mostly expansionary as of 2008 while public investment had 
boomed just before the crisis and turned restrictive during the crisis. The policy stance turned 
restrictive in 2010 and strongly so in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. However, most 
consolidation efforts focussed on public investment with some contribution also coming 
from public consumption while transfers and subsidies were largely spared, also reflecting 
the operation of automatic stabilisers. 
The study also analysis the determinants of this expenditure pattern with an econometric 
analysis. The regression results confirm an overall procyclical expenditure stance which was 
driven by public consumption, i.e. excess spending over our neutral policy rule(s) in this 
category tended to increase when macroeconomic conditions improved. The degree of 
spending expansion tends to be negatively affected by the size of government debt and the 
presence of effective fiscal rules. On the other hand, EMU-related interest savings affected 
the expenditure stance positively. Revenue windfalls and shortfalls exert a significant effect 
on government investment spending. 
What are the implications? First, euro area countries had mostly manoeuvred themselves into
less safe fiscal positions due to an expansionary stance during the boom years. Or in other words,
with more «neutral» policies in economic «good times» the margin to implement countercyclical
fiscal policies during the crisis would have been significantly higher in many countries. 
Second, the evidence of this study provides support to those arguing in favour of prudent 
expenditure rules oriented on prudently assessed potential growth trends. This should help 
counter political economy biases towards pro-cyclicality especially in good times and in the 
presence of revenue windfalls and/or over-estimations of potential growth. An expenditure 
rule has, therefore, rightly been embedded in the European fiscal framework. Strict imple­
mentation of European rules on deficits, debt and expenditure will be important to guard 
against expenditure pro-cyclicality in the future. 
Third, the paper suggests that countries should also watch the channels via which expan­
sionary expenditure policies work. Guarding against expanding civil servants and public 
wages in good times seems an important lesson as compensation of employees in one of the 
main components of public consumption (see Lamo et al. 2013 for further details). Prevent­
ing an expansion of transfers and subsidies spending in crisis may in particular require flex­
ible complementary policies in the labour market (so that flexible wages limit the increase in 
unemployment and, consequently, the increase in unemployment benefits). This may also 
help preserve public investment spending from excessive cuts avoiding potential damages on 
medium/term growth prospects. 
Finally, our study has disentangled primary expenditures to make explicit not only the 
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have modified expenditure composition, by assigning a prevalent position to some of them 
during the recent fiscal consolidation processes. It is still too early to draw overall lessons 
from the boom-bust cycle in Europe as further post-crisis adjustment will be necessary. It 
seems to us that taking into account the counter-cyclical nature of welfare related spending 
(transfers and subsidies in our study), would require to both save in good times and ensure 
an efficient allocation (avoiding redundant programmes) in the bad ones. In this regard, with 
the exception of countries facing financial constraints in the recent years, our study finds 
evidence of the under-emphasis of public spending adjustments on transfers and subsidies so 
far (contrary to public perception). Surely this is going to be a particular challenge in the 
years to come, notably as aging-related pressures on public spending will rise. 
Notes 
1. 	 Alternatives measures may be considered as neutral. See Brück and Zwiener(2006) and Menguy (2008) for 
further information. We build here upon the basis of rules introduced in Hauptmeier et al. (2011) as they rely 
their neutrality measures on country-specific growth prospects (potential GDP as benchmark). 
2. 	 Substantial data revisions may result in a different assessment of the underlying policy stance when using ex­
post and real-time data respectively (see, e.g., Cimadomo, 2008). 
3. 	 For a discussion on different ways to measure the fiscal multipliers, see Ilzetzki et al. (2013). 
4. 	 This may reflect the coordinated fiscal expansion in Europe at the beginning of the financial crisis. 
5. 	 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
6. 	 We go beyond the empirical exercise presented in Hauptmeier et al. (2011) by carrying out differentiated re­
gressions for the different expenditure components we analyse in Section 2 of this paper. 
7. 	 Klemm (2014) presents a selection of studies dealing with this issue by applying alternative methodologies and 
instruments. Alesina et al. (2008) consider as instrument a summary measure of the output gap of the rest of 
the region. Carnot and De Castro (2015) highlight that the change in the output gap may offer a complementary 
and more robust signal (see European Commission, 2006, Part IV, or OECD, 2003). 
8. 	 For a definition and a detailed description of the computation of this index see European Commission (2006) 
and Debrun et al. (2008). The index is normalised to have a zero mean and unit variance. 
9. 	 Note that we pool results corresponding to different rules (NPG and RPECB) with the aim of identifying a 
generic/average role of the different determinants. Moreover, a comprehensive list of tables considering alterna­
tive construction of revenue surprise variables and rule-specific results are available upon request. This sensitive
analysis confirms the robustness of our main findings. 
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Resumen 
Este estudio analiza la composición y los principales determinantes de la dinámica de gasto público 
en una selección de países de la zona euro entre 1999 y 2013. Para evaluar la posición de las políticas 
de gasto público de cada país utilizamos los indicadores desarrollados en Hauptmeier et al. (2011). 
Nuestros resultados indican que las políticas expansivas obtenidas para el gasto total en el perio­
do  1999-2009 fueron impulsadas principalmente por el consumo público. Por otro lado, después 
de 2008, Transferencias y subsidios fueron eminentemente expansivas mientras que la inversión pú­
blica –que se disparó justo antes de la crisis– se volvió restrictiva durante la misma. Asimismo, obte­
nemos que la política fiscal se volvió restrictiva desde 2010, con mayor intensidad en Grecia, Irlanda, 
Portugal y España. No obstante, la mayoría de los esfuerzos de consolidación se centraron en la in­
versión pública y el consumo público y mientras que las transferencias y subvenciones se mantuvie­
ron en gran medida. Nuestro análisis econométrico, que abarca el periodo 2000-2013, muestra un 
comportamiento significativamente procíclico del consumo publico que conducía la dinámica general 
del gasto público. Obtenemos además que el tamaño de la deuda pública y la presencia de reglas 
fiscales eficaces tienden a favorecer comportamientos más prudentes por la vía del gasto. Por otra 
parte, encontramos que los ingresos extraordinarios derivados del ahorro de intereses relacionados 
con la Unión Monetaria favorecieron políticas expansivas por la vía del gasto. Por último, variaciones 
significativas –positivas o negativas- en el nivel de ingreso esperado, ejercieron un efecto significativo
en el comportamiento de la inversión pública. 
Palabras clave: gasto público, deuda pública, reglas de gasto, sostenibilidad, política fiscal. 
Clasificación JEL: E17, E61, E65, H50, H60. 
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